



Authenticated Keyword Search in Scalable Hybrid-Storage Blockchain

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Blockchain Technology

• Distributed ledger maintained by a network of mutually untrusted nodes





Smart Contract

- A user-defined program executed by the blockchain network
 - Interact with the data stored in the blockchain
 - Execution integrity is ensured by the consensus protocol
- Smart contract makes blockchain to be programmable
 - Facilitate automatic logics without participation of third parties

	Traditional Computer	Blockchain VM
Storage	RAM	Blockchain
Computation	CPU	Smart Contract

Blockchain Scalability

- Storing *any* information on chain is not scalable
 - Large size: document, image, etc.
 - 500KB per TX x 500 TX per sec => 2 Gb per sec => 8,000 TB annually
- Off-chain storage:
 - Raw data is stored outside of the blockchain
 - A hash of the data is kept on chain to ensure integrity





Hybrid Storage Blockchain



- Integrity-assured queries needed as the SP is not fully trustful
- Key idea: authenticated query processing
 - Use an authenticated data structure (ADS) to support queries
 - Leverage both smart contract and SP to maintain the ADS



Keyword Search Queries

- Keywords are expressed in the disjunctive normal form (DNF)
- $Q = q_1 \lor q_2 \lor \cdots \lor q_n$, where $q_i = w_1 \land w_2 \land \cdots \land w_l$
- Example: ("COVID-19" ∧ "Vaccine") ∨ ("SARS-CoV-2" ∧ "Vaccine")
- Seen as the union of the results from each conjunctive component
- Focus on *conjunctive keyword search*



Challenge

- High update cost: each on-chain update requires a transaction
- Transaction fee for smart contract execution
 - Modeled by gas for storage and computation (Ethereum)
- Challenge: how to design gas-efficient ADS to be maintained by the smart contract while supporting efficient keyword search

Operation	Gas Used	Explanation
C _{sload}	200	load a word from storage
C _{sstore}	20,000	save a word to storage
$C_{supdate}$	5,000	update a word to storage
C _{mem}	3	access a word in memory
C _{hash}	$30 + 6 \cdot x$	hash a <i>x</i> -word message
C_{tx}	21,000	execute a transaction
C_{txdata}	68	transact a byte of data



Contributions

- Suppressed Merkle^{inv} index
 - Reduce the ADS maintenance cost in terms of gas
- Chameleon^{*inv*} index
 - Further reduce the ADS maintenance cost to a constant level while still supporting efficient queries
- Optimized Chameleon^{*inv**} index
 - Enhance the query and verification performance of the Chameleon^{inv} index



Preliminaries

- ADS: Merkle Hash Tree (MHT)
 - Binary tree
 - Hash function combining the child nodes
 - Verification object (VO): sibling hashes along the search path
 - Verify: reconstructing the root hash
- Merkle B-tree (MB-tree)
 - Integrate B-tree with MHT



To authenticate object: 14 VO: $\{h(25), h_1, h_6\}$



Preliminaries

- Authenticated join with MB-tree
 - Executed in rounds and each round has a target with matching and boundary objects
 - Proof includes the Merkle path of the targets and boundary objects
 - Verification: reconstruct the Merkle roots and check the boundary objects with the corresponding targets





Baseline Solution

- Merkle^{*inv*} index
 - Build an inverted index
 - Maintain an MB-tree for each keyword's object list
 - MB-tree's search key is object ID
 - Query processing: a conjunctive keyword query is equivalent to joining keywords' object lists

Keyword ID	Keyword w		Object List for w
1	COVID-19	\mapsto	1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19
2	Symptom	\mapsto	4, 6, 9, 11, 24, 26
3	SARS-CoV-2	\mapsto	1, 3
4	Vaccine	\mapsto	4, 5, 8





Baseline Solution

- Merkle^{*inv*} index
 - Maintained by both the smart contract and the SP

Keyword ID	Keyword w		Object List for w
1	COVID-19	\mapsto	1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19
2	Symptom	\mapsto	4, 6, 9, 11, 24, 26
3	SARS-CoV-2	\mapsto	1, 3
4	Vaccine	\mapsto	4, 5, 8





VO_{sp}: Merkle proofs of targets, matching & boundary objects



Baseline Solution

- Merkle^{*inv*} index maintenance
 - When o_i is added to the Merkle^{inv} index, (o_i. id, h(o_i)) is inserted to the MB-tree of each its keyword
 - Suffer from high maintenance cost
 - Data update requires hash updates on the entire tree path
 - Cost of adding an object to a single keywords' MB-tree is logarithmic w.r.t. expensive storage operations

 $C_{\text{MI}}^{\text{insert}} = \log_F N \left(2C_{\text{sstore}} + 2C_{\text{supdate}} + (2F+1)C_{\text{sload}} + C_{\text{hash}} \right) + C_{\text{sstore}}$



- Observation: only on-chain root hashes (VO_{chain}) are needed during the authenticated keyword search
- General idea:
 - Fully suppress the on-chain MB-trees
 - The SP maintains the complete structures to support efficient queries
 - Key issue: how can the smart contract maintain the root hashes without knowing the complete structure?
 - Ask the off-chain SP to construct an *update proof*, during a new object's insertion
 - With *update proof*, MB-trees' root hashes can be updated



- Generation of *update proof* for a MB-tree by the SP
 - Assuming object ids are monotonically increasing
 - Include the tree path of the right-most leaf node
- Example for \mathcal{T}_S
 - A new object s_{13} with id = 23 is added to T_S
 - Update proof: (i) $\langle h_G \rangle$; (ii) $\langle h_D, h_E \rangle$; (iii) $\langle h_{S_{11}}, h_{S_{12}} \rangle$; (iv) $\langle h_{S_{13}} \rangle$





- Verification of *update proof* by smart contract
 - Reconstruct the root hash and compare with the one stored onchain
- Example for \mathcal{T}_S
 - $h\left(h_G |h\left(h_D |h_E |h(h_{S_{11}} | h_{S_{12}})\right)\right)$ and compare it with the one stored on-chain
 - Check $h_{S_{13}}$ w.r.t. the one sent by DO





- Update the root hash using update proof by smart contract
 - in a bottom-top manner
- Example for \mathcal{T}_S
 - Object s_{13} with id=23 is added to \mathcal{T}_{S}
 - Leaf *F*'s node hash: $h'_F = h(h_{s_{11}}|h_{s_{12}}|h_{s_{13}})$
 - Node *H*'s: $h'_H = h(h_D | h_E | h'_F)$
 - Root hash: $h(h_G | h'_H)$





- Cost Analysis
 - Consider updating the MB-tree for a single keyword
 - $C_{\text{SMI}}^{\text{insert}} = \log_F N \left(F \cdot |h| \cdot C_{txdata} + 3C_{hash} + (2F + 1)C_{mem}\right) + 2C_{sload} + C_{supdate}$
 - The coefficient of logarithmic term only contains cheap operations: *C_{txdata}*, *C_{hash}*, *C_{mem}*
 - The costly operations C_{sload}, C_{supdate} are with a constant coefficient
 - $C_{\rm SMI}^{\rm insert} < C_{\rm MI}^{\rm insert}$

We have reduced the maintenance cost. Can we do even better?



Preliminaries

- Vector Commitment (VC)
 - VC maps a vector of messages to a fixed-sized commitment, which can be used to prove that m_i is the i^{th} committed message

$$\overrightarrow{m}=m_1$$
 m_2 m_3 \dots m_i \dots m_{q-1} m_q

- $\operatorname{Gen}(1^{\lambda}, q) \to \operatorname{pp}$
- $\operatorname{Com}_{\operatorname{pp}}(\langle m_1, \dots, m_q \rangle, r) \to \{c, \operatorname{aux}\}$
- $\operatorname{Open}_{\operatorname{pp}}(i, m, \operatorname{aux}) \to \pi$
- $\operatorname{Ver}_{\operatorname{pp}}(c, i, m, \pi) \to 0/1$



Preliminaries

- Chameleon Vector Commitment (CVC)
 - A CVC is a trapdoor vector commitment scheme. A user who owns a private trapdoor can update a message m_i in a vector without changing the vector's commitment.

$$\overrightarrow{m} = m_1 \mid m_2 \mid m_3 \mid \dots \mid m_i' \mid \dots \mid m_{q-1} \mid m_q$$

- Gen $(1^{\lambda}, q) \rightarrow \{\text{pp, td}\}$
- $\operatorname{Com}_{\operatorname{pp}}(\langle m_1, \dots, m_q \rangle, r) \to \{c, \operatorname{aux}\}$
- $\operatorname{Open}_{\operatorname{pp}}(i, m, \operatorname{aux}) \to \pi$
- $\operatorname{Ver}_{\operatorname{pp}}(c, i, m, \pi) \to 0/1$
- $CCol_{pp}(c, i, m, m', td, aux) \rightarrow aux'$
 - $\operatorname{Open}_{\mathrm{pp}}(i, m', \operatorname{aux}') \to \pi'$
 - $\operatorname{Ver}_{\operatorname{pp}}(c, i, m', \pi') \to 0/1$



- Objective
 - Design an ADS that has constant maintenance cost while supports efficient authenticated keyword search
- Inspiration
 - CVC: one can update a vector without changing its digest using a secret trapdoor
 - Build a Chameleon tree with fixed root commitment



- Chameleon Tree
 - Each node (except the root) corresponds to a data object
 - Each node's commitment is determined by its position pos and keyword w
 - We use the root commitment c₀ and current object number cnt to authenticate the tree







- Chameleon Tree
 - Each non-root node is a 4-tuple $\langle h(o), c_{pos}, \pi_{pos}, \rho_{par,j} \rangle$
 - *h(o)*: the hash of object *o*
 - c_{pos} is the node commitment derived from *pos* and keyword *w*:

 $c_{pos} = \operatorname{Com}_{pp}(\langle 0, \dots, 0 \rangle, PRF(sk, pos||w))$

- π_{pos} proves that h(o) is the 1st element stored in c_{pos} (find collision of c_{pos})
- $\rho_{par,j}$ proves that the node is linked to the j^{th} child of the parent node at position par (find collision of c_{par})





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- Chameleon Tree Maintenance
 - Create a new node for $o \rightarrow \text{compute } c_{pos}, \pi_{pos}$
 - Link the new node to its parent node -> compute $\rho_{par,j}$
 - Store $\langle c_{pos}, \pi_{pos}, \rho_{par,j} \rangle$ as the insertion proof of o
- Chameleon^{*inv*} index
 - Each keyword corresponds to a Chameleon tree.
 - Constant maintenance cost: $C_{\text{Chameleon}}^{\text{insert}} = C_{supdate}$





- Keyword search query processing
 - A keyword search is transformed to join the query keywords' Chameleon trees for each conjunctive component
 - Build a hash map for (*id*, *pos*) since the Chameleon tree is indexed by the position
 - Add the membership proofs of (i) target; (ii) matching & boundary objects of each round to VO_{sp}

- Authenticated membership test with Chameleon Tree
 - Given object's position *pos*, the SP generates a membership proof
 - Include the insertion proofs of the object at *pos* and all its ancestor nodes except the root
 - Example: s_3 's membership proof $\{c_{s_3}, \pi_{s_3}, \rho_{1,1}^s, c_{s_1}, \rho_{0,1}^s\}$
 - Verification: use π_{s_3} to prove s_3 is stored in n_{s_3} ; use $\rho_{1,1}^s$ to prove n_{s_3} is the first child of n_{s_1} ; use $\rho_{0,1}^s$ and root commitment c_{s_0} to prove n_{s_1} is the first child of the root.



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- Mitigate the client's verification cost
 - Create a Bloom filter for every *b* objects in each Chameleon tree
 - A Bloom filter can efficiently prove an object's non-existence
 - Smart contract maintains the Bloom filters for integrity assurance
- Authenticated Keyword Search
 - Similar to Chameleon inv index
 - Use Bloom filters in the second index to test whether a matching object exists
 - If existing, proceed as Chameleon^{*inv*} index
 - Otherwise, the consecutive object is set as the target to continue the join process



Performance Evaluation

- Datasets
 - DBLP: 5M paper entries including titles, authors, and affiliations
 - Twitter: 1.5M tweets
 - 32-bit incremental identifier
- Parameters of the index
 - Fan-out of the MB-tree set to 4 according to the word size 32 bytes
 - $(f-1)l_d + fl_p < 32$ byte
 - Fan-out of Chameleon tree is set to 4
 - Fixed Bloom filter size: 256 bytes
 - # objects inserted to a Bloom filter b = 30
- Denote the four indexes as MI, SMI, CI, and CI^*



Gas Consumption vs Dataset Size



- SMI reduces the average gas consumption from US\$11.21 to US\$2.69 (saving 76%)
- CI takes US\$0.24 and CI* takes US\$0.50 for each insertion

The gas consumption is reported in US\$ with an average gas price of 15 Gwei and Ether price of US\$229 as of June 15, 2020.



Authenticated Query Performance



- **CI**^{*} is more efficient owing to its use of Bloom filters
- Verification of CI and CI* is relatively slow owing to the costly CVC operations



Authenticated Query Performance



- Default setting b = 30 yields the best results
- If b is too small, the effectiveness of using Bloom filter to filter the unmatched objects is not obvious
- If b is too large, a high false positive rate makes it less effective



Thanks! Q&A